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The 2019-20 Houston Rockets asked a fundamental question about the game of basketball: Are centers necessary? The premise was simultaneously a complete novelty and a logical extension of a decade's worth of progression away from traditional big men. Chris Bosh was too skinny to play center, and then he played center. Draymond Green was too short to play center, and then he played center. History made a compelling case for Daryl Morey's innovation. If the NBA could go from Shaquille O'Neal to Chris Bosh, and then Chris Bosh to Draymond Green, then why couldn't it go from Draymond Green to Robert Covington? Why must Green be the final link in the chain?

Such bold deviations typically yield somewhat immediate results. In a perfect world, the Rockets would have preferred a more definitive answer to Morey's question in the 2020 playoffs. The truth is messier. The Rockets lost with small ball, but it would be hard to say they lost because of small ball. Evidence for that theory certainly exists. The gigantic Lakers won the rebounding battle 227-163 in their second-round series, and the 6-foot-10 Anthony Davis shot 60 percent from the field against defenders who couldn't meet his eye-line. Being small hurt the Rockets.

But it was supposed to benefit them as well, and it didn't for factors out of their control. Houston sacrificed size for space. It did so in large part to clear runway for Russell Westbrook, who was athletically compromised by a quad injury and COVID-19. Danuel House Jr.'s absence cut into that spacing as well, and made it easier for the Lakers to double James Harden. The Rockets didn't have a clear path to beating the Lakers beyond shooting variance, but they could've competed with them. That at least might have better informed their roster decisions entering the 2020-21 season. 

That left Morey's successor, Rafael Stone, to fly blind. Further complicating matters were trade requests from Harden and Westbrook, thoroughly reported discontent from fellow role players and a new coach in Stephen Silas whose views on basketball probably aren't as progressive as Morey's simply because nobody's ever have been. In a condensed offseason and with a possible Harden-less future in-mind, Stone had to decide whether he would abandon Morey's experiment or embrace. The answer, so far, has been both. 

Few undeniable conclusions could be drawn from Houston's brief foray into micro ball, but two stand out as largely unassailable. The first is that Westbrook functions better without a center. Lineups featuring Westbrook and Clint Capela scored only 107.6 points per 100 possessions, per Cleaning the Glass, but lineups with Westbrook and no Capela averaged 114.7. The second is that Harden functions better with a center. While Houston discovered a variety of pick-and-roll workarounds, Harden visibly missed Capela as a lob target. Lineups featuring Harden and Capela but no Westbrook scored 118.2 points per 100 possessions. These truths gave Houston's front office its marching orders: Find big men who can enhance Harden without alienating Westbrook. 

They settled on the market's most mysterious free agent: Christian Wood. The former Detroit Piston has started only 16 NBA games, but in the 12 that came in Detroit, he averaged 21.9 points on 56 percent shooting from the field and 40.8 percent from behind the arc. The Pistons scored 1.504 points per possession when Wood rolled to the basket last season, placing him in the 95th percentile league-wide, per Synergy Sports, but were nearly as good when he spotted up. Such possessions granted Detroit 1.187 points per possession, good for the 86th percentile. 

Numbers like that simply don't happen over a meaningful sample size. To put them in perspective, playoff Anthony Davis was worse on both fronts en route to the championship, putting up 1.426 points per possession as a roller and 1.16 points per possession in spot-up situations. There's no telling how sustainable these numbers will prove, but they shouldn't be a total mirage. Wood is a rare athlete. He's not new to the concept of shooting 3-pointers. He probably won't be the best offensive center in basketball next season, but he's going to be closer to that than the minimum-salary nomad he was before his Pistons breakout. 

DeMarcus Cousins exists on the other end of the spectrum. He once was the best offensive center in basketball. His value has since plummeted to the point at which Houston could not only get him for the minimum, but do so on a non-guaranteed contract. Injuries were the culprit. There's no telling how healthy Cousins is or will remain. But as long as the Rockets have him, they have yet another center capable of checking center and non-center boxes. 

Cousins isn't remotely as springy as Wood, and wasn't even at his peak. He isn't going to finish pick-and-rolls. He's going to finish broken possessions. The healthy version of him was once among the best post-up players in the NBA. The numbers have grown less favorable with time, but the NBA has also grown smaller. There's something to be said for the idea of having a skilled 270-pound bowling ball as an exit valve. It gives Houston's offense a switch-buster. Teams presumably don't want to watch Cousins throw their 6-5 wing into the basket. Houston shunned the post-up on principle under Morey's watch. It isn't exactly planning to morph into the Lakers. But Houston's end-of-shot-clock offense for eight years has been "get the ball to James Harden." Alternatives are welcome. 

His shot is just as welcome. Cousins has largely hovered around league average from behind the arc since the 2016-17 season, hitting 34.7 percent of his 3-pointers on five attempts per game. If that underwhelms you, remember that Covington's career average is 35.6 percent on 6.6 attempts per game. The difference isn't exactly enormous, and the consequences for misplaying Cousins' jumper are far more severe. Covington can't put the ball on the floor. Cousins can. He'll inject some much-needed ball movement into a Rockets offense that made the second-fewest passes per game in basketball last season. Cousins has averaged as many 5.4 assists per game over a full season. Harden has had exactly three Houston teammates match that feat: Westbrook, Chris Paul and Jeremy Lin. Now he's getting that kind of passing out of a center. 

He's getting the standard big-man fare out of Cousins and Wood as well. Houston was a preposterously bad rebounding team after the Covington acquisition, pulling in only 44.8 percent of total boards. Cousins has led the NBA in both total offensive rebounds and defensive rebounding rate. Opponents shot 3.3 percent better within six feet of the rim against Houston than they did on average, but 6.4 percent worse against Wood, per NBA.com. These are the benefits of having tall human beings on your basketball team. The Rockets tried to find tall human beings who did things normally reserved for smaller ones. 

They didn't check every box. Cousins will never be able to switch as aggressively defensively as Covington's Rockets did, and Wood's defensive sample is far too small to be conclusive. A more conservative scheme will limit turnovers. Fewer turnovers mean fewer fast breaks. It's a sacrifice the Rockets are used to making. Houston has finished seventh or better on offense five years in a row. If a team needs to score at historic rates to meaningfully contend, it could hardly ask for a better superstar to do it with than Harden. 

And if Harden leaves? Cousins can be waived at the drop of a hat. Wood is 25 years old. They can fit with anyone if their shooting holds. They were signed as contending pieces. They'd work as rebuilding pieces in a pinch as well.

The Rockets hope it doesn't come to that. The basketball world should, too. This Houston roster won't provide the definitive answer to Morey's great question that last season's might have, but it offers a possible glimpse into a more realistic future, one that flanks every elite scorer with bigs who can split the difference between center and forward. Such teams existed before Houston, but never quite so intentionally. The Rockets appear as committed to shooting as ever, but in integrating size into the equation, they've sidestepped last season's existentialism entirely. The Rockets don't need to know if centers are necessary anymore. They've found ones with the necessary non-center skills to keep them competitive entering the 2020-21 season.