Rash two-point decisions careening off the charts

I finally found something more difficult to figure out than the umpiring at the World Series, and that's the two-point conversion. NFL coaches don't seem to understand that you never, ever, ever go for two before you're into the fourth quarter -- and I mean well into the fourth quarter.

On Sunday, for instance, the New York Jets' Rex Ryan called for a deuce with the Jets down by five and just over a minute and a half left, which is OK except he called for it with a minute and a half left in the third quarter.

Rex Ryan was just one of the coaches burned by two-point decisions. (US Presswire)

Not to be outdone, Green Bay's Mike McCarthy dialed up a two with 10 1/2 minutes left in his game against the Vikings, way too soon to start playing games with numbers. Yet he took the chance and suffered the consequences.

He lost.

"I still think the rule of thumb is that you try it with no more than three possessions left in the game," said former Baltimore coach Brian Billick. "And certainly the conventional thinking is that you wait until the fourth quarter, and probably the middle of the fourth quarter."

Only conventional thinking seldom figures into this equation. Coaches last weekend couldn't wait to take the two-point conversion out for a spin, going for it seven times and cashing in twice. Only eight of 26 two-point attempts have been successful this season, or an average of 37 percent, and that's down from the 47.9 percent figure the past five seasons.

But it's not the rate of success that intrigues me -- it's the timing. Patience may be a virtue, but in the NFL it's a casualty. Coaches can't resist the temptation to cut into a lead, even when it means screwing up the rest of the game.

They stand on the sidelines with two-point charts, but they would be better off relying on common sense. When former San Francisco coach Steve Mariucci worked in Green Bay in the early 1990s, then head coach Mike Holmgren had Mariucci and Andy Reid, another Packers' assistant, devise a two-point chart. They did, compared it against others across the league and found what Mariucci described as "a number of discrepancies."

That should have told them something. Deciding when and where to go for two points is an inexact science, yet it rests with people whose careers depend on winning. So, naturally, they're going to be jumpy.

In the end, of course, the responsibility for calling for the two-pointer rests with the head coach, and sometimes that's not all that good. They have to make decisions galore -- with some calling their own plays -- so it's easy to be distracted. Billick was one of those who drew up the plays, and he recalled a game where he signaled for the two-point conversion earlier than expected, puzzling some of his players and assistants.

"Why we doing it?" one of them asked.

"Because I want to go for it!" Billick barked.

So they did.

"It was only later," Billick said, "that I realized I lost track of the point differential."

Hey, it happens. That's one reason I'd suggest more coaches identify someone on their staff to handle two-point attempts and keep them locked up until, oh, say, midway through the fourth period. When Mariucci coached the San Francisco 49ers, he had a young assistant take care of two-point calls, and it was his responsibility to tell Mariucci what he was thinking before the 49ers scored -- thereby eliminating any last-second confusion.

"So we're getting ready to receive a kick," Mariucci said, "and he tells me, 'Coach, if we score, we're going for one."

Maybe there should be more of that going on. All I know is that there are a lot of guys who can't wait to signal for two-point conversions when they're better off sitting still and letting the game play itself out. The problem, as both Mariucci and Billick pointed out, is that once you fail you're behind the eight ball with, as Billick put it, "permutations going in too many different directions."

Translation: The field goal that might've tied the game suddenly won't, with the Jets-Dolphins game Exhibit A. If Ryan had resisted the temptation to go for two points, the Jets might not have needed a field goal on their last possession to send the game into overtime. Yeah, Miami might not have gone for two points, either, had the Jets kicked the extra point, but the Dolphins did. And they failed. So instead of a field goal, the Jets had to have a touchdown ... and we know how that worked out.

"Sometimes there's an emotional response, which is the wrong thing to do," said Billick. "I can see trying it earlier than you might expect if there is bad weather, your offense and defense are bad or you're on the road. You're a genius if you make it. And if don't you look bad."

Too many guys need to be reminded again. It's time to go back to class.