Three reasons why NPB stars got paid so much less than expected in MLB free agency this offseason

There was a significant gap between contract predictions and actual deals signed by Murakami, Imai and Okamoto

Here are two undeniable statements: 1) the Los Angeles Dodgers have repeated as World Series champions in part by leveraging the international free-agent market to land right-handers Yoshinou Yamamoto and Roki Sasaki; and 2) Major League Baseball is a copycat league. 

Taken together, which outcome seemed likelier about the incoming crop of Japanese free agents: that they would have received greater paydays than expected or lesser? The reasonable answer would have been the former. Yet that isn't what transpired over the past month. Instead the three main Japanese transfers -- slugger Munetaka Murakami, right-hander Tatsuya Imai and infielder Kazuma Okamoto -- had to settle for shorter, cheaper pacts than anticipated.

To wit, earlier in the winter, CBS Sports predicted Murakami would ink a six-year pact worth $140 million. The thinking was that he would topple the average annual values that Seiya Suzuki and Masataka Yoshida received when they transferred to MLB ($17 million and $18 million, respectively) thanks to inflation and his 40-homer upside. He did not. Instead, Murakami settled for two years and $34 million to join the Chicago White Sox.

Imai, meanwhile, inked a three-year, $54 million agreement (which could be worth up to $63 million with incentives) with the Houston Astros that is spiritually a series of one-year deals. He's free to opt out after either the 2026 or 2027 seasons. That's a far cry from the numbers executives threw out to ESPN last September. As Jeff Passan relayed: "the lowest number, among the dozen officials and scouts surveyed, was $80 million."

As for Okamoto, he took the longest deal of the three, agreeing to a four-year, $60 million contract with the Toronto Blue Jays. Unlike Imai, his is a straight deal with no buyouts or options.

A misread now and then is to be expected. But three in the same international free-agent class should get you asking: what's going on here? Here are three factors that likely explain why this happened.

1. Risky profiles

It's no knock on these three players to write that they aren't on Yamamoto's level. Whereas Yamamoto checked every box -- he had an outstanding track record of performance; he was young; and his pitch-tracking data spoke well to his chances of succeeding in MLB -- there are legitimate reasons to have reservations about these three. 

For Murakami, it's his extreme swing-and-miss tendencies and lack of secondary value; for Imai, it's his history of wildness; and for Okamoto, it's how he'll fare against MLB-caliber velocity. You don't have to pretend they're doomed to acknowledge that their range of probable outcomes is wider than the average bear. In turn, it only makes sense that teams resisted engaging in a full-fledged bidding war. 

Without robust demand, it's hard for any agent to achieve a contract that features both a long term and a high wage.

2. Chilly market

You can't just pin these contracts on the players and their perceived blemishes. Most of the league has shown a real reluctance to spend money. Entering the final week of December, only 12 teams had added even $50 million in future obligations through trades and free agency, per ESPN. Eleven teams had added $15 million or fewer. 

To be clear, that isn't $15 million in 2026 money. That's $15 million in total dollars spent over the lifetime of the deal. Put another way, if your favorite team handed out a two-year pact worth $8 million annually -- Phil Maton money, basically -- then congratulations, they flexed more financial might than more than a third of the majors. 

You can argue against spending on this player or that player. At some point, though, you have to be willing to fork out for talent. Otherwise, whatever financial flexibility you're preserving becomes a burden, not an advantage, if your goal is to win as many games as possible.

That's reality, even if a chunk of the industry disagrees.

3. Larger trend

There's another factor worth highlighting: a long-term shift in how the industry approaches contracts. 

If you look at recent free-agent classes, you can find a number of established MLB players who had to settle for contracts that punt term for other perks. For instance, third baseman Alex Bregman signed a three-year deal with the Boston Red Sox last winter that included two opt-out opportunities (he took the first one and is a free agent again this winter). That's the same arrangement Imai made with the Astros, albeit with less money involved. First baseman Pete Alonso, on the other paw, agreed to a two-year pact worth $54 million to return to the New York Mets last offseason, despite being one of the best home-run hitters of his generation (he triggered his own opt out and signed a five-year, $155 million contract with the Orioles this winter). That's the Fancy Cat version of Murakami's deal.

Teams favor these arrangements because they understand how aging curves work. Knocking a few years off a deal reduces the chances they're left paying large sums to a player in deep decline. Conversely, some players may prefer this approach since it helps them maximize their earning potential. If Imai or Murakami prove they're up for competing at a high level in MLB, you can rest assured they'll make more money over the long haul by taking this route than if they had signed for five or six years. 

Of course, both sides are making trade-offs, too: either the teams or the players might wish they added years to those agreements when everything is said and done. For now, though, this is increasingly the way that baseball conducts business with anyone but the elite few.